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Public–private sector segmentation in the Pakistani labour market
Monazza Aslam *, Geeta Kingdon
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
1. Introduction
The Pakistani labourmarket is characterised by very largewage gaps between public and private sectorworkers. In 2004–
2005, men in government jobs earned on average Rs. 8211/month ($137)1 and in private jobs only Rs. 5420 ($90), a
private:public ratio of 1:1.5. This raw public–privatewage difference is even higher forwomen, the private:publicwage ratio
being 1:3, i.e. Rs. 6614/month ($110) in public jobs and Rs. 2160/month ($36) in private sector jobs2. However, raw
differences in earnings can be misleading if the public sector employs individuals with superior observed or unobserved
characteristics (unobserved characteristics are those that are observed by employers but are unavailable to researchers). To
obtain estimates of wage differentials between similar public and private sector employees, i.e. to get a sense of the true
extent of private–public wage gap, it is important to control for worker characteristics.
This paper asks whether there is discrimination in the Pakistani labour market as between the public and private sectors
and investigates whether the extent of private–public differentiation is equally large for men and women. To do this, it
investigates the determinants of public and private sector wages and examines public–private wage differentials, drawing
on the latest nationally representative household dataset: the Pakistan Living Standards Measurement Survey (henceforth
PSLM, 2005). The paper therefore does the following: (1) estimates earnings functions by employment sector; (2)
decomposes the public–private wage differentials into ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ components; and (3) does the above
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A B S T R A C T
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ogies to obtain robust estimates of the wage differential and the results reveal that public
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separately for male and female wage employees. Gender differentiated analysis is especially important as the wage
determination process and labour market differentiation by sector may be different for men and women.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study in Pakistan to look at these issues separately for male and female wage
employees. Much of the interest in this debate in Pakistan is recent and is covered in three studies. One of these ﬁnds very
small public sector wage premia over formal private sector jobs (Nasir, 2000) while the other two (Hyder, 2007; Hyder &
Reilly, 2005) report ﬁnding quite substantial wage differentials across the two sectors. The ﬁnding of a large public–private
wage differential is not uncommon in other developing countries. For instance, a study in India ﬁnds that the public-sector
wage premium ranges from 62 to 102% over private-formal sectors and between 164 and 259% over private-informal sector
jobs (Glinskaya & Lokshin, 2005). The narrower public–private pay gaps reported in the former study are linked to the
somewhat arbitrary exclusion of informal sector workers3.
The present study sheds light on an important dimension missing from both previous studies—that of gender. It is useful
to study whether the extent of private–public wage gap differs by gender because existing studies suggest that the Pakistani
labour market is characterised by exceedingly different outcomes for men and women in other respects such as labour force
participation, occupational attainment and conditional earnings (Aslam, 2007a,b; Kingdon & Soderbom, 2007).
The empirical strategy used here relies on three main methodologies: (1) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); (2) sample-
selectivity corrected estimates, (using multinomial logits to control for labour force participation and for private–public
sector choice, conditional on wage employment); and (3) household ﬁxed-effects. The last (household ﬁxed-effects)
approach is a stringent control for worker unobservables that commonly generate biases in parameter estimates4. Finally,
the preferred estimates are used to decompose the public–private wage gaps using the familiar Oaxaca’s methodology,
separately for males and females.
Several explanations have been proposed for the existence of the unexplained portions of public–private wage
differentials. These include supply demand models, vote-maximisation models, human-capital models, segmented labour
markets, rents, and bargainingmodels among others (Bender, 1998, pp. 178). Gunderson (1978, 1979) suggests that themain
difference between the two sectors is that while the public sector budget faces a political constraint by voters, the private
sector is characterised by proﬁt maximisation. In this case, the public-sector wage ﬂoor is set by market forces and that
public sector employers justify higher pays as their employees are engaged in vote-producing activities. Bender (1998),
summarising literature on wage-differentials from developed and developing countries, argues that a large part of the
differential between the two sectors can be attributed to the role of trade unions5. However, it must be noted that the
evidence onwage-differentials is based on equations using different econometric speciﬁcations and the ﬁndings can be quite
sensitive to the choice of methodology adopted.
Past evidence investigating sectoral wage-differentials in developing countries suggests that wage gaps are negative and
often large, sometimes in the region of 500% (Bender, 1998, pp. 213). In terms of differences by gender across the two sectors,
much work stems from developed countries where the ﬁndings reveal large differences in the pay determination process by
gender. In some studies public–private differentials are larger for women compared to men (see for instance Gunderson,
1979; Hou, 1993 cited in Bender, 1998; Venti, 1987). The latter ﬁnding is sometimes seen to suggest that there must be less
gender wage discrimination in the public sector (Smith, 1976 cited in Bender, 1998).
The public-sector in Pakistan is marked by wage compression and, hence, is similar to that in many other developing
countries. Wages in the public sector are largely determined through the political process rather than on the basis of
productivity (Ali, 1998; Nasir, 2000). As in other countries, the government is also a popular employer because it offers
permanency, job ﬂexibility and fringe beneﬁts often not available to poorly protected private sector employees. Given the
poor incentivemechanisms prevailing in this sector and also because of a lack of supervision and ineffective monitoring, the
public sector is marked by frequent job-shirking and absenteeism among employees (Ali, 1998). Somewhat perversely,
however, these features also make government jobs especially attractive to women in view of their family commitments.
The government of Pakistan is a large employer, employing individuals across a range of occupations, skills-sets and
personal characteristics. The public sector absorbs almost 30% of wage earners aged 15–65 in the sample used in this study
while the private waged sector employs the remaining 70% Pakistan Living Standards Measurement Survey 2005 (PSLM
2005). The majority of the latter are in ‘unprotected’ private sector waged jobs6. The wages of public sector employees in
Pakistan are formulated under the RegulationsWing of the Finance Division. The government’s ‘Basic Pay Scale’ consists of a
basic pay and various allowances with a small annual increment built into the pay scale. The basic pay and allowances all
vary by grade and department (such as health, education, etc.). For instance, a primary school teacher is hired in grade 7 and
her basic pay would be between Rs. 2555/month ($43) to Rs. 6755/month ($113) with an annual increment of Rs. 140 ($2). A
3 We are grateful to a referee of this journal for pointing this out.
4 Because of small sample sizes, we are constrained to estimating these models only on sub-samples of male wage earners.
5 Whether trade unions generate the large public–private wage differentials in Pakistan has not been formally studied largely due to the paucity of data.
However, one wonders whether trade unions can play any role, let alone an effective role, in collective bargaining to generate these differentials between
the two sectors in Pakistan. This is because while the Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO, 1969) allows trade union activity, in reality collective bargaining
activities are largely suppressed through various other legislation and ordinances. For instance, workers in hospitals and in civil and defence services cannot
form unions. Where workers are allowed to form unions, they cannot carry out strike actions and the new IRO passed in 2002 allows the government to
effectively end any trade union strike that has lasted more than 15 days (Human Development in South Asia, The Employment Challenge, 2003, pp. 113).
6 (US Department of Labour at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/oiea/wagestudy/FS-Pakistan.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki).
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medical doctor, on the other hand, would be hired in grade 17 with basic pay ranging from Rs. 7140/month ($120) to Rs.
17,840/month ($299) and an increment of Rs. 535 ($9) annually (Ofﬁce Memorandum, GOP, 2005).
Wages of unskilledworkers are set by the government through theNationalMinimumWage Commission. These laws are,
however, applicable only to industrial and commercial establishments employing 50workers ormore. These laws also cover
workers in the formal sector, leaving the large informal sectors and the agricultural sector workers unprotected. While the
minimumwage was Rs. 1500/month ($25 at $1 = Rs. 60) when ﬁrst instituted in 1992, it has been raised to Rs. 4000/month
(about $67) in 2006. The minimum wage for skilled workers is set by provincial labour regulatory bodies. Whether these
laws are formally implemented in the work place cannot be determined due to paucity of data.
Our ﬁndings show that the large raw gaps in public and private sector earnings persist for both males and females even
after conditioning on observed characteristics (such as education levels, experience, and province and region ﬁxed-effects).
More interestingly, controlling for worker unobservables using a household ﬁxed-effects methodology does not eliminate
public–private differentials for men, pointing to the existence of large sectoral differences and also indicating that ‘rent-
seeking’ rather than our inability to control for unobservables may be generating these effects. This study also ﬁnds the
public–privatewage gap to bemuch larger for women than formen signifying labourmarket differentiation to be far greater
for women. Finally, the decomposition exercise reveals that, in the case of men, a higher proportion of the public–private
wage-gap can be explained by observed characteristics than in the case of females.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology underlying this study. Section 3
discusses the characteristics of the data while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2. Econometric approach
Consistent estimation of earnings functions is important not only in its own right but also, in this study, for arriving at
estimates that can be used for a robust decomposition of the private and public sectorwage-differentials. There are twomain
approaches used in the literature to identify public–private wage differentials—the ‘single equationmethod’ (or the dummy
variable approach) and the ‘separate equations method’. In the ﬁrst, a single earnings function is estimated with the usual
covariates incorporating one or more dummy variables to represent sectoral choice. This usually takes the following form:
LnYi ¼ bþ b1iXi þ b2PUBLICi þ ei (1)
where Ln Yi is the log of wages of individual i, Xi is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i (including experience,
gender, schooling, etc.),PUBLICi is a dummyvariable equalling ‘1’ if individual is employed in thepublic sector and ‘0’ otherwise
and ei is the individual-speciﬁc error. The coefﬁcient b2 measures the premium, if any, to belonging to the public sector.
The ‘dummy variable’ approach suffers two main drawbacks. First, it constrains the vector of all other coefﬁcients to be
identical across the sectors. For example, while there may be signiﬁcant differences in how education is rewarded in the
public and private sectors, the b coefﬁcients (used tomeasure the return to education) are not allowed to vary by sector. The
second problem has to do with the potential endogeneity of the dummy variable representing sectoral choice. This problem
arises because entry into the public or private sector may be determined by variables often unobserved by researchers. For
example, more able or motivated individuals may strive for employment, say, in the public sector. Moreover, if employers
also reward these traits in the form of higher earnings, these unobserved characteristics will reside in the error term ei in (1).
The potential (positive) correlation between PUBLICi and ei violates the basic conditions of the classical linear model and
would generate an upward bias in all parameter estimates.
The alternative, ‘separate equations’ approach overcomes one of the drawbacks of the ‘single equations’ method—by
allowing the vector of coefﬁcients to vary by sector. Thus, the two earnings functions to be estimated are
LnY1i ¼ b1iXi þ e1i (2)
LnY2i ¼ b2iXi þ e2i (3)
whereX is the vector of explanatory variables,b represents the corresponding vector of coefﬁcients, e are the i.i.d error terms
and the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the public and private sectors, respectively.
However, OLS estimation of Eqs. (2) and (3) may not yield consistent results. This is mainly because endogeneity of
PUBLICi in the ‘single equation’ method translates into ‘sample selection’ in a multi-equation framework. The sectoral sub-
sample of workers is a potentially non-random draw from the population. The standard approach in the literature addresses
this concern by including an additional regressor (lambda) in earnings functions which corrects for the bias generated
through sector-selection (Heckman, 1979).
However, two further problems remain unaddressed. First, while recognising the bias arising from selection into a given
sector (and correcting for it using a Heckman–Lee procedure in the ‘double equations’ method or instrumenting for the
sectoral dummy in the ‘single equations’ approach), a second source of endogeneity/selection, though recognised in various
studies, is often not corrected for in econometric estimates of public–private wage differentials. This bias occurs because
most earnings functions are estimated on samples of wage-earners only and exclude non-labour force participants, the
unemployed, the self-employed, etc. (termed ‘others’ in this paper). Correcting for this second source of sample selection
would require a further correction term in the earnings functions for consistent estimation.
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In order to allow for both types of selection (i.e. thewage participation versus non-participation decision and the choice of
public or private sector conditional on participation), one could use a multinomial logit model (MNL) in the ﬁrst step to
represent three choices: (1) waged work in the public sector; (2) waged work in the private sector; and (3) ‘other’, i.e. non-
labour force participation, self-employment, etc. The correction-terms generated from the ﬁrst step can then be incorporated
in the earnings functions as additional regressors as suggested by Lee (1983). We adopt this approach in this paper as it
attempts to address both selection issues without imposing strong prior the selection process 7.
Finally, the ‘schooling’ variable in earnings functions is also potentially endogenous. While ‘separate equation’ models
with employment choice estimated through a multinomial model will control for the two potential selection issues, the
endogeneity of schooling remains unresolved. The household ﬁxed-effects technique provides a useful though not entirely
convincing solution for dealing simultaneously with the issues surrounding endogeneity and sample selectivity. This
approach rests on the grounds that arguably a good part of the unobserved heterogeneity (generating endogeneity in
schooling and selection biases) is common to family members and any differences in unobserved ability and their impact in
determining education should be lowerwithin rather than between families. By introducing sub-samples of households with
at least two wage-earning individuals of a given gender in a household (and also in a given sector of employment in this
case), this ‘ﬁrst-differencing’ approach effectively controls for all household-level variables common across these individuals
within a household. Furthermore, as most studies (including the current one) control for sample-selection using observed
household-level variables such as demographic composition and asset-ownership as exclusion restrictions determining
participation (and sectoral choice), controlling for household ﬁxed-effects also simultaneously controls for sample selection
issues (Behrman & Deolalikar, 1995; Pitt & Rosenzweig, 1990). The parameter estimates generated through this technique
are also used to decompose the wage gap between public and private sector employees8.
Summarising, our empirical strategy will be as follows. We start by estimating earnings functions using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS)onapooledsampleofwage-employedmalesand femalesworking inpublicandprivatesectors.Thenwewill split
the sample into workers (male and female) employed either in the public or in the private sectors. Recognising that these
estimates constrain the vector of coefﬁcients for both genders to be identical, albeit across sectors, our ﬁnal OLS estimates will
separately estimate earnings functions on males in public and private sector jobs and on females in public and private sector
employment. As sub-sample analysis imposes sample-selection concerns, correction-terms generated from a ﬁrst-step
multinomial logit will be included in earnings functions to determine whether selectivity poses any potential biases in our
sample. Finally, individual earnings in public and private sectors (for both males and females) will be decomposed (using
Oaxaca’s method) into the portion ‘explained’ by characteristics and the ‘unexplained’ portion to determine whether public–
private wage differentials prevail and if they can be explained by differences in the endowments of workers.
Broadly speaking, two different empirical approaches can be used for studying public–private sector wage differentials.
The ﬁrst of these includes the PUBLIC sector dummy variable as a predictor of ‘discrimination’ in a pooled regression of
earnings functions. However, as already mentioned above, this approach yields biased results because it assumes that the
wage structure is the same for both sectors. A second approach employs ‘decomposition’ to separate the observed wage gap
between sectors into the components that are ‘explained’ by differences in characteristics across sectors and the
‘unexplained’ portions. This method was ﬁrst developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), and later extended to
overcome the index number problem (Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988).
We decompose the public–private wage gap using the technique proposed by Oaxaca (1973). OLS, selectivity-corrected
and household ﬁxed-effects estimates of earnings functions for men and women are used to predict earnings. The wage-gap
is decomposed into two components: (1) the portion ‘explained’ by differences in characteristics of workers in either of the
two sectors and (2) the residual, ‘unexplained’ portion reﬂecting differences in wage structures or rewards across public and
private sectors. The unexplained component could represent differential rewards to possessing characteristics or ‘rents’ in
the labour market. However, if there are important differences in the unobserved or unmeasured characteristics of public
and private sector employees, then the residual component cannot be purely attributed to ‘rents’ and one must wonder
whether differences in unobserved or unmeasured individual ability or evenmotivation generate this gap in earnings across
individuals in the two sectors. However, Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) note that results of the decomposition exercise are
sensitive to the underlying method used to estimate wage gaps.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study are drawn from the latest, nationally representative household survey from Pakistan: the
PSLM, 2005. This dataset is based on a sample of more than 70,000 households from rural and urban regions across the four
provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan) and from each district in the country (from more than a 100 districts).
7 If one strongly believed that labour market choices are made in a sequential way in Pakistan, i.e. that individuals ﬁrst choose whether to be wage
employed and, conditional on being that decide to work either in the public or private sector, the bivariate probit may have been the model of choice.
8 Pure family-effect models are most plausible for identical twins but not so convincing for father-son, mother-daughter or sibling pairs. This is because
while identical twins have the same genes andmay have faced similar backgrounds, thismay not be the case of parent–child pairs or even for siblingswithin
the same household.
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However, we rely on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) portion of the survey on a sub-sample of some
14,000 households on which detailed information needed for the calculation of earnings functions was collected.
The HIES-section of the PSLM asked detailed employment questions from all individuals aged 10 and above. However, in
line with past work, our analysis is restricted to individuals aged 15–65 (55,723 observations) and those in wage
employment (relegating individuals reporting self-employment in agriculture or non-agricultural activities, unpaid family
work, unemployment or non-labour force participation to the ‘Other’ category). This leaves us with a sample of 10,884
individuals (9640 males and 1244 females); i.e. roughly 20% individuals aged 15–65 are wage employees (a higher
proportion, 34% males, and only about 4.5% females in this age group are wage employees)9. Finally, for the purpose of this
study, the unique feature of this survey (compared to past household datasets such as the Pakistan Integrated Household
Survey) is that is asks all individuals aged 10 and above to report their ‘sector of employment’. The question allows for ﬁve
categories: (1) public; (2) private business; (3) private; (4) NGO; and (5) other. As we have restricted the sample to wage
workers only, the answer to this question will determine whether awage employeeworks in either of the above sectors. We
collapse the private-business, private, NGO and ‘other’ category into a single category called ‘private’. Among the 10,884
wage workers, roughly 27% report employment in the public sector and the remaining are deemed to be working in private-
sector jobs10. There is no difference in sectoral choice by gender (2623 males and 352 females in waged work are public
sector employees in this sample).
Table 1 describes the variables used in estimation and Table 2 shows summary statistics for the full sample and for the
three employment sectors: private, public and ‘Other’. The dependent variable in the earnings functions is LNMEARN (log of
monthly earnings in rupees). The standard Mincerian function stipulates that individual earnings are a function of experience
and education. Experience is often computed as (age – years of completed schooling – 5) with the view that individuals start
school aged 5 and enter the labour market upon completing schooling. This can be misleading for Pakistan not only because
childrenmay not enter school aged 5 (and thismay differ by gender), but also because a large proportion of the labour force is
illiterate, having never attended school at all. Another constraint in the PSLM is that it asks individuals about ‘completed levels
of schooling’ rather than ‘completed years of schooling’. For these reasons, AGEYRS (and the quadratic AGE2) are used to proxy
for experience and experience squared. Education is denoted in the form of dummy variables indicating levels of completed
schooling with no education (NOEDU) as the base category. Unless otherwise stated, province and regional ﬁxed effects are
included in all earnings functions to control for any provincial or regional differences in earnings.
Table 1
Description of variables used in OLS, FE and the MNL functions, ages 15–65
Variable Description
WAGEWORK Participation in salaried wage work during the past month
MALE Dummy variable, equals 1 if individual is male, 0 otherwise
AGEYRS Age in completed years
AGE2 Square of age
NOEDU Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed 0 years of education, 0 otherwise
LESSPRIM Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed 1–4 years of education, 0 otherwise
PRIMARY Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed 5–7 years of education, 0 otherwise
MIDDLE Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed 8 or 9 years of education, 0 otherwise
MATRIC Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed 10 years of education, 0 otherwise
INTER Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed FA/FSc, 0 otherwise
BACHELORS Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed BA/BSc, 0 otherwise
MA Dummy equals 1 if individual has completed MA, MSc, 0 otherwise
ODEGREES Dummy equals 1 if individual has obtained a degree in engineering, MBBS, computers,
agriculture, MPhil/PhD. Or other, 0 otherwise
URBAN Dummy equals 1 if resides in urban area, 0 otherwise
PUNJAB Province is Punjab, yes = 1, no = 0
SINDH Province is Sindh, yes = 1, no = 0
NWFP Province is NWFP, yes = 1, no = 0
BALOCHISTAN Province is Balochistan, yes = 1, no = 0
PUBLIC Sector of work is public = 1, private = 0
CHILD5 Number of children aged 5 or less in the household
ADULT70 Number of adults aged 70 or more in the household
MARRIED Married, yes = 1, no = 0
OALAND Own agricultural land, yes = 1, no = 0
ONALAND Own non-agricultural land, yes = 1, no = 0
LAMBDA Selectivity term
9 These proportions of wage employees are relatively smaller compared with the PIHS (2002) ﬁgures reported in Aslam (2007a). While roughly similar
proportions of bothmen andwomen (aged 15–65) are wage employees in the PIHS (2002) and PSLM (2005) data sets—23 and 20%, and 42%men and almost
7% women reported wage employment according to the PIHS (2002), these ﬁgures fall to only 34 and 4.5% according to the PSLM (2005).
10 The proportion of wage-employed individuals in the public sector from the PSLM dataset (26%) is much smaller than the proportions reported by Nasir
(2000) using the Labour Force Survey, 1997 (56%) and by Hyder and Reilly (2005) using the 2002 Labour Force Survey (45%).
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Table 2
Summary statistics of variables used in the MNL selection equations and in earnings functions, males and females 15–65 in waged work
Variable Mean characteristics of males Mean characteristics of females
Waged work in ‘Other’ All Waged work in ‘Other’ All
Public Private Public Private
WAGEWORK 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.34 (0.47) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.21)
PUBLIC – – – 0.094 (0.29) – – – 0.013 (0.11)
LNMEARN 8.73 (0.63) 8.01 (0.69) – – 8.53 (0.72) 7.16 (0.87) – –
AGEYRS 38.68 (9.81) 31.53 (12.25) 31.79 (14.96) 32.37 (14.06) 33.84 (9.50) 31.05 (12.31) 32.06 (13.51) 32.05 (13.43)
AGE2 1592.49 (775.22) 1143.99 (899.95) 1234.59 (1123.58) 1245.34 (1045.75) 1235.03 (722.60) 1115.72 (881.22) 1210.16 (997.98) 1207.42 (991.49)
LESSPRIM 0.02 (0.15) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) 0.00 (0.05) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17)
PRIMARY 0.07 (0.26) 0.13 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.20) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27)
MIDDLE 0.07 (0.26) 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26)
MATRIC 0.25 (0.43) 0.15 (0.36) 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.26 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.31)
INTER 0.12 (0.32) 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) 0.16 (0.36) 0.04 (0.21) 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19)
BACHELORS 0.20 (0.40) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.23) 0.25 (0.43) 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17)
MA 0.10 (0.30) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.02 (0.13) 0.17 (0.38) 0.03 (0.18) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.08)
ODEGREES 0.05 (0.22) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.12) 0.06 (0.23) 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.06)
URBAN 0.55 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
SINDH 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
NWFP 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40) 0.31 (0.46) 0.08 (0.27) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
BALOCHISTAN 0.24 (0.43) 0.12 (0.33) 0.16 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.11 (0.32) 0.03 (0.17) 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34)
CHILD5 1.25 (1.34) 1.14 (1.37) 1.19 (1.49) 1.18 (1.45) 1.15 (1.48) 0.95 (1.25) 1.28 (1.50) 1.27 (1.49)
ADULT70 0.13 (0.40) 0.12 (0.37) 0.14 (0.40) 0.13 (0.39) 0.21 (0.47) 0.14 (0.39) 0.15 (0.41) 0.15 (0.41)
MARRIED 0.87 (0.33) 0.60 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 0.57 (0.49) 0.70 (0.46) 0.52 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47)
ONALAND 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.18) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.31) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
N 2623 7017 18,539 28,179 352 892 26,300 27,544
Note: ‘Public’ includes individuals reporting sector of employment to be ‘government’ and ‘Private’ constitutes those reporting employment in private or NGO sector. ‘Other’ constitutes individuals who are non-
labour force participants, unemployed, livestock-sellers and self-employed (agriculture/non-agriculture). S.E.s are reported in parentheses.
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Finally, selectivity-correction in stage 1 (in the multinomial logit) requires ﬁnding exclusion restrictions—variables that
determine sectoral choice but not earnings conditional on being in that sector. As always, this is a challenge. Conforming to
past work, we use household demographic variables (CHILD5 and ADULT70) and land ownership (ONALAND). These are
chosen on the belief that the presence of very small children or elderly individuals in the household and ownership of an
asset like land may determine an individual’s choice between the three options: public sector-waged employment, private
sector-waged employment or ‘Other’ without having a direct effect on individual earnings. For example, public sector-waged
employment often offers ﬂexibility in working conditions which may suit a woman with younger children. Alternatively,
land ownership may provide the ‘safety net’ that may encourage individuals to forgo the security of wage employment and
become either self-employed, give up a current job and seek another (unemployed), or even completely exit the labour force.
Table 2 shows striking differences between public and private sector employees. Both males and females earn
signiﬁcantly more in public-sector jobs. Interestingly, the public-sector wage premium is higher for womenwho earn about
68% more in government jobs compared to females in private wage employment. Men in government jobs, on the other
hand, earn 50% more than their counterparts in private jobs. Both men and women in public sector jobs are older than in
private jobs and if age proxies for experience this suggests that government sector employees are marginally more
experienced than private sector ones. Finally, for both genders the raw data shows that public-sector wage employees are
more educated—a high proportion of men in government (versus private) jobs have at least 10 years of education (Matric).
This is true for females as well suggesting that more educated females opt to seek employment in the public sector.
Finally, it is worth noting that we do not condition on occupation (unlike Nasir, 2000) because our primary objective in
this study is to consistently estimate earnings functions by employment sector and gender to determine the degree of wage
Table 3
Occupational status and monthly earnings for wage earners by sector, gender (15–65)
Occupation Male Female
Public Private Public Private
% Earning
(Rs. per month)
% Earning
(Rs. per month)
% Earning
(Rs. per month)
% Earning
(Rs. per month)
Senior ofﬁcials 8.1 16,021 1.6 14,616 5.1 11,262 1.0 7633
Professionals 15.9 9,014 3.0 9,241 39.5 7,277 10.0 5595
Ass. professionals 12.0 10,308 2.8 5,805 12.2 8,718 3.6 2425
Clerks 15.4 6,653 2.1 4,960 5.7 4,634 0.8 4417
Service, shop, sale 26.3 6,719 34.2 3,892 26.7 5,483 24.2 1847
Skilled Agri 0.7 5,650 6.7 2,600 0.3 – 19.2 1202
Craft and Trade 0.8 6,135 5.8 4,169 0.6 1,500 6.4 1112
Plant, machine Op. 3.4 5,765 9.1 4,130 0.0 – 1.2 2690
Elementary 17.5 6,849 34.7 3,579 9.7 5,885 33.6 1634
All 100 8,215 100 4,150 100 6,632 100 2101
Table 4
OLS earnings functions (males/females) aged 15–65
Variable OLS
Pooled coefﬁcient (S.E.) (1) Public coefﬁcient (S.E.) (2) Private coefﬁcient (S.E.) (3)
MALE 0.648 (0.043)*** 0.190 (0.039)*** 0.829 (0.047)***
AGEYRS 0.074 (0.004)*** 0.064 (0.007)*** 0.079 (0.004)***
AGE2 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)***
LESSPRIM 0.065 (0.035)* 0.005 (0.058) 0.050 (0.037)
PRIMARY 0.111 (0.023)*** 0.109 (0.048)** 0.085 (0.025)***
MIDDLE 0.193 (0.025)*** 0.140 (0.039)*** 0.176 (0.026)***
MATRIC 0.302 (0.027)*** 0.300 (0.040)*** 0.252 (0.025)***
INTER 0.432 (0.054)*** 0.448 (0.042)*** 0.356 (0.070)***
BACHELORS 0.621 (0.060)*** 0.582 (0.045)*** 0.612 (0.095)***
MA 1.001 (0.079)*** 0.843 (0.056)*** 1.299 (0.116)***
ODEGREES 1.081 (0.105)*** 1.006 (0.076)*** 1.138 (0.158)***
URBAN 0.188 (0.025)*** 0.139 (0.023)*** 0.195 (0.028)***
SINDH 0.053 (0.074) 0.089 (0.044)** 0.089 (0.080)
NWFP 0.058 (0.037) 0.108 (0.034)*** 0.077 (0.041)*
BALOCHISTAN 0.163 (0.046)*** 0.063 (0.028)** 0.198 (0.061)***
PUBLIC 0.320 (0.054)*** – –
CONSTANT 5.657 (0.082)*** 6.494 (0.153)*** 5.442 (0.081)***
R2 0.455 0.3444 0.354
N 10,728 2942 7786
Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is natural log ofmonthly earnings (Rupees). Robust S.E.s
are reported in parentheses. (–) Denotes not applicable. NO_EDUCATION and PUNJAB are the reference categories for education splines and province,
respectively.
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differentials. As occupational choice is likely to be determined by education, conditioning on occupation would change the
interpretation of school effects. However, Table 3 shows some interesting descriptive statistics disaggregating occupational
choice by gender and sector of employment. For instance, the highest proportion of men employed in the public sector work
in services, shop and sales-related occupations (26%) followed by almost 18% in elementary occupations. Men in the private
sector are also invariably concentrated in these two employment sectors (roughly 34% in each of the occupation categories).
It is also apparent from the raw data that almost invariably (with the exception of professionals) wages are substantially
lower in the private sector. For women, among thoseworking in the public sector almost 40% are professionals while 27% are
concentrated in services, shop and sales-related occupations. In the private sector, on the other hand, wage-workingwomen
are concentrated in low-skilled occupations such as services, agriculture and elementary occupations. This is hardly
surprising given that raw data in Table 2 has shown thatmen andwomen in the public sector have attained higher education
levels compared to their counterparts in the private sector.
4. Results
This section starts by presenting the earnings functions estimates followed by anOaxaca decomposition of private–public
wage differentials in the Pakistani labourmarket. The analysis beginswith estimating ‘single equation’ OLSmodels on pooled
samples of male and female wage employees by incorporating a dummy variable (PUBLIC) representing the employment
sector in which the individual works. The results are presented in column (1) of Table 4 and are not surprising—male wage
workers earn signiﬁcantlymore than females and the age-proﬁle has the standard shape. The coefﬁcients on various levels of
schooling increase with higher levels of education, suggesting a convex education-earnings proﬁle, a ﬁnding consistent with
recentwork in Pakistan (Aslam, 2007a,b; Kingdon& Soderbom, 2007). For the purpose of this study, the coefﬁcient of interest
is that on the PUBLIC dummy—it is large and signiﬁcantly positive suggesting a wage premium to public-sector employees.
However, as mentioned in Section 2, the speciﬁcation in column (1) has several drawbacks, one being that it constrains
equality in the vector of coefﬁcients across the two sectors. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 re-estimate earnings functions
separately for the public and private sector wage employees to overcome this restriction. There are some interesting
differences in earnings function estimates across the two sectors. For instance, the gender gap in earnings among public-
sector workers is signiﬁcantly smaller than in the private sector. This is unsurprising as government pay scales are
compressed for men and women. The existence of a gender gap within the government sector can be attributed to different
occupational choices between men and women. Table 3 has revealed that within the government sector, the highest
proportion of women is in ‘professional’ occupations. However, even within this broad occupation category (such as
‘professional’), women earn signiﬁcantly less than men. This could be because among professional occupations, women opt
for the more ﬂexible jobs with lower working hours. Because data on hours worked is not available, this explanation cannot
be further tested.
The age-proﬁles also differ by employment sector—while earnings peak earlier for government sector workers (32 years),
they peak much later (almost 40 years) for private sector employees, a gap of almost 8 years. The pattern on the education-
Table 5
OLS and selectivity-corrected earnings functions, males (15–65)—public and private
Variable OLS Selectivity corrected
Public (1) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Private (2) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Public (3) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Private (4) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
AGEYRS 0.063 (0.008)*** 0.088 (0.004)*** 0.037 (0.033) 0.089 (0.005)***
AGE2 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)***
LESSPRIM 0.038 (0.046) 0.042 (0.036) 0.001 (0.062) 0.042 (0.036)
PRIMARY 0.116 (0.047)** 0.083 (0.024)*** 0.056 (0.090) 0.082 (0.024)***
MIDDLE 0.161 (0.038)*** 0.166 (0.024)*** 0.099 (0.093) 0.162 (0.026)***
MATRIC 0.310 (0.037)*** 0.254 (0.024)*** 0.193 (0.156) 0.247 (0.030)***
INTER 0.461 (0.045)*** 0.319 (0.062)*** 0.316 (0.182)* 0.310 (0.066)***
BACHELORS 0.590 (0.044)*** 0.567 (0.089)*** 0.422 (0.214)** 0.559 (0.092)***
MA 0.833 (0.056)*** 1.152 (0.122)*** 0.631 (0.264)*** 1.144 (0.123)***
ODEGREES 0.999 (0.075)*** 1.036 (0.153)*** 0.831 (0.233)*** 1.029 (0.155)***
URBAN 0.141 (0.023)*** 0.205 (0.028)*** 0.142 (0.023)*** 0.208 (0.028)***
SINDH 0.097 (0.045)** 0.068 (0.078) 0.114 (0.046)** 0.067 (0.078)
NWFP 0.142 (0.037)*** 0.094 (0.042)** 0.168 (0.040)*** 0.095 (0.042)
BALOCHISTAN 0.053 (0.028)* 0.170 (0.058)*** 0.019 (0.094) 0.166 (0.060)**
L – – 0.132 (0.162) 0.017 (0.043)
CONSTANT 6.699 (0.172)*** 6.120 (0.081)*** 7.549 (1.057)*** 6.090 (0.110)***
R2 0.345 0.274 0.345 0.274
N 2594 6921 2594 6921
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is natural log ofmonthly earnings (Rupees). Robust S.E.s
are reported in parentheses. (–) Denotes not applicable. NO_EDUCATION and PUNJAB are the reference categories for education splines and province,
respectively.
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dummy coefﬁcients shows coefﬁcients increasingwith increasing levels of education. The coefﬁcients for different education
levels are not signiﬁcantly different between the two sectors.
Wage determinants may differ across the gender domain and constraining the vector of coefﬁcients in the public and
private sector by introducing a gender-dummy may be too restrictive. Tables 5 and 6 re-estimate OLS earnings functions
separately formales and females in public and private sector employment. The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) for
males in Table 5 and similarly for females in Table 6. Columns (3) and (4) of the aforementioned tables show ﬁndings from
the selection-corrected estimates which include a correction-term generated from ﬁrst-step multinomial logit estimates
(reported in Appendix Tables A1 for males and A2 for females).
Before discussing the results of main interest in Tables 5 and 6, focus brieﬂy on the sectoral choice equations reported in
Tables A1 and A2. The dependent variable is SECTOR and equals 1 if individual is either a non-labour force participant,
unemployed, unpaid family worker or self-employed (in agriculture or otherwise) and this category is deﬁned as ‘Other’, 2 if a
wage employee in the private sector (‘private’) and 3 if employed in the public sector and paid regular wages (‘public’). The
excluded category is ‘Other’. Themultinomial estimates are important for the generation of the selection-terms to be included
in the earnings functions and in determining whether sample selection is important. Because the objective of the ﬁrst-step
estimation is to control for sample selection (if any), we discuss only the signs and signiﬁcance of the exclusion restrictions
reported in Tables A1 and A2. Asmentioned before,we use three exclusion restrictions: CHILD 5, ADULT70 andONALAND. The
exclusion restrictions were pared down to a more parsimonious set after experimentation11. All three are individually
signiﬁcant for males in both the private and public employment sector. While the demographic variables have the expected
negative sign, the sign on land-ownership is positive in both sectors suggesting that owning non-agricultural land increases
likelihood of being employed on private or public sectors rather than being in the ‘Other’ category. For the sample of women
(Table A2), we notice two things: ﬁrst, none of the exclusion restrictions is signiﬁcant for the public sector employees and
secondly, having a child aged less than 5 signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of employment in the private sector compared to
‘Other’. The exclusion restrictions are jointly signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level for males in private and public sector jobs and for
females in the private sector (p-value of the F-tests are 0.000) though this is not true for women in the public sector.
Tables 5 and 6 reports the earnings function estimates for males (females) in public and private sector employment
without (columns 1 and 2) and with (columns 3 and 4) sample-selection correction. Focus ﬁrst on the selection–correction
terms in columns (3) and (4) of the two tables. Clearly, the selection–correction terms are small and insigniﬁcant for all. It
Table 6
OLS and selectivity-corrected earnings functions, females (15–65)—public and private
Variable OLS Selectivity corrected
Public (1) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Private (2) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Public (3) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
Private (4) coefﬁcient
(Robust S.E.)
AGEYRS 0.079 (0.019)*** 0.019 (0.010)* 0.205 (0.096)** 0.018 (0.010)*
AGE2 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.001)* 0.000 (0.000)
LESSPRIM 2.188 (0.124)*** 0.026 (0.144) 2.211 (0.126)*** 0.075 (0.142)
PRIMARY – 0.020 (0.140) – 0.066 (0.163)
MIDDLE 0.463 (0.171)*** 0.322 (0.128)** 0.088 (0.311) 0.427 (0.148)***
MATRIC 0.158 (0.164) 0.056 (0.102) 1.277 (0.786) 0.132 (0.106)
INTER 0.300 (0.153)* 0.453 (0.180)* 1.606 (0.916)* 0.493 (0.167)***
BACHELORS 0.485 (0.155)*** 0.743 (0.195)*** 1.963 (1.044)* 0.724 (0.195)***
MA 0.864 (0.174)*** 1.677 (0.221)*** 2.752 (1.348)** 1.582 (0.245)***
ODEGREES 1.021 (0.197)*** 1.552 (0.276)*** 2.772 (1.195)** 1.400 (0.307)***
URBAN 0.047 (0.071) 0.093 (0.076) 0.294 (0.241) 0.078 (0.074)
SINDH 0.075 (0.084) 0.300 (0.131)** 0.096 (0.086) 0.373 (0.147)**
NWFP 0.079 (0.087) 0.077 (0.108) 0.387 (0.225)* 0.223 (0.185)
BALOCHISTAN 0.113 (0.084) 0.644 (0.171)*** 0.454 (0.243)* 0.827 (0.240)***
L – – 0.765 (0.541) 0.216 (0.184)
CONSTANT 6.308 (0.329)*** 6.503 (0.208)*** 1.360 (3.586) 6.920 (0.322)***
R2 0.353 0.303 0.357 0.304
N 348 865 348 865
Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is natural log ofmonthly earnings (Rupees). Robust S.E.s
are reported in parentheses. (–) **Denotes not applicable. NO_EDUCATION and PUNJAB are the reference categories for education splines and province,
respectively.
11 To begin with, MARRIED and ONALAND were also included in the set of exclusion restrictions on the premise that being married and owning non-
agricultural land may inﬂuence sectoral choice but should not directly impact earnings. However, MARRIED and ONALAND were signiﬁcant in estimated
earnings functions invalidating them as credible exclusion restrictions. They are, however, not included in the ﬁnal versions of earnings functions as we are
interested in estimating as close to a standard-Mincerian earnings function as possible (rather than an extended one). The validity of the three remaining
exclusion restrictions (CHILD5, ADULT70 and OALAND) was also tested. In no instance (male and female earnings functions in private and public sectors)
was either of these exclusion restrictions independently signiﬁcant. F-tests also revealed the exclusion restrictions to be jointly insigniﬁcant in all four
speciﬁcations (p-values of the F-tests for the joint signiﬁcance of CHILD5, ADULT70 andOALANDwere: 0.63, 0.15, 0.26 and 0.42 in the earnings functions for
males in private and public-sector jobs and females in private and public-sector jobs, respectively).
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appears that the estimated effects corresponding to the selection terms are small. This ﬁnding, especially for womenmay be
attributable, given the relatively small reported value for the constant term, to the fact that there is limited variation in the
selection term across the female sub-sample. This, in turn, could be because the variables used to capture the observable
characteristics of womenwho are selecting into the public sector are fairly similar. Thus, the selection term is competing for
the role of the constant and the estimated effect of the constant gets washed-out. In this case, the relevant selection effects
have potentially not been correctly identiﬁed here. However, we draw comfort from two recent studies from Pakistan and
Bangladesh that report similar ﬁndings. In the ﬁrst, Aslam, 2007a,b, using data from2001 from Pakistan, estimates selection-
corrected earnings functions for women wage earners and ﬁnds a similar result though the estimates for men show strong
negative selection into wage employment (though those estimates do not differentiate by sector of employment). In
Bangladesh, Asadullah (2005) also notes that the selection-terms for males and female are insigniﬁcant despite strongly
signiﬁcant exclusion restrictions in the selection equations. We use OLS estimates as our preferred estimates which are now
discussed12.
Fig. 1. Predicted earnings, males (public and private sector).
Fig. 2. Predicted earnings, females (public and private sector).
12 However, the assignment of all self-employed individuals into ‘other’ may not be sensible as the process determining self-employment activity possibly
differs substantially from that determining unemployment or being out of the labour force. We tried an alternative way of estimating the MNL model by
allowing for four categories: out of the labour force/unemployed, self employed (agriculture and non-agriculture), wage employed in private sector and
wage employed in the public sector. Selection-terms computed from this alternative model were incorporated in earnings functions but they remained
insigniﬁcant andmade no signiﬁcant difference to the results.Moreover, Bourguignon et al. (2007) argue that the Dubin andMcFadden (1984) procedure for
selection bias correction is to be preferred to the commonly used Lee (1983) approach (used here). Moreover, they suggest that even if the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is rejected, the multinomial logit model still provides fairly good correction for the outcome equation. The IIA was tested using
the three category and four category MNL estimated in this paper (using the small-Hsiao test). The ﬁndings show that while the IIA is rejected in several
cases in the four category MNL, in no instance is it rejected in the three category MNL model estimated in this study.
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For males and females (Tables 5 and 6), note that the explanatory power (R2) is higher for public-sector workers. This is
because of stricter salary scales in this sector. For males (Table 5), the OLS estimates reveal standard age-earnings proﬁles in
both sectors though earnings peak earlier (age 31.5) for public-sector employees and much later (age 44) for private-sector
workers. The coefﬁcients on the education splines are indicative of convex education-earning proﬁles in both sectors and
also show that they do not signiﬁcantly differ across the two sectors (except for INTER where the coefﬁcient is of a greater
magnitude in the public sector andMAwhere the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly greater formales in private-sector employment).
Table 6 reveals a different picture for women. For instance, while women’s age-earning proﬁle has the standard shape in the
public sector this is not the case in the private sector. Also note that women’s earnings in the public sector peak aged almost
40, unlike public-sector males whose earnings peak almost 9 years earlier. The coefﬁcients on the education dummies also
show different proﬁles—coefﬁcients are positive and increasing successively in both sectors only after INTER. Also note that
while the private sector positively rewards women with at least MIDDLE-level schooling this is not the case in the public
sector. This is possibly because a large majority of women opt for teaching jobs and while the private sector often hires
women who have acquired at least middle-level schooling, the public sector imposes more stringent requirements and
women can only enter teaching professions after completing at least MATRIC (Andrabi et al., 2006; Aslam, 2007b). The
education–earnings proﬁles for men and women in the public and private sectors are plotted in Figs. 1 and 2. It is clear that
public sector wages are invariably higher than private sector wages at all levels of education, even though the public–private
wage gap narrows considerably at higher levels of education. For women the second data point (showing extremely low
wages at 3 years of education) is driven by very few observations and is not statistically signiﬁcant. Figs. 3 and 4 depict the
estimated probability of sectoral choice by education. There are striking differences by gender: while formen the probability
of private sector waged work steadily declines with education and the probability of public sector waged work steadily
increases with education throughout the full range of education levels, for women there is a positive relationship between
Fig. 3. Males: estimated probability of sectoral choice and education.
Fig. 4. Females: estimated probability of sectoral choice and education.Note: These predictions are based on themultinomial logits reported in Appendix A1
and A2 with education speciﬁed as continuous and non-linear rather than in splines.
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education and chances of public waged work only after 8 years of schooling and between education and chances of private
waged work after 15 years of schooling.
4.1. Public–private wage differentials
In this section, we examine public–private wage differentials separately for male and female wage employees. The total
difference in earnings between public and private sector employees (male and female) is decomposed into the portion
‘explained’ by differences in characteristics between workers in the two sectors and the portion left ‘unexplained’ by
differences in characteristics. This is done using Oaxaca’s methodology (Oaxaca, 1973) detailed in Section 2. The preferred
(OLS) estimates reported in columns (2) and (3) in Tables 5 and 6 are used. The results of the decomposition exercise are
presented in Tables 7A for males and 7B for females.
For men, expressed in natural logs, the total difference in earnings between public and private sector employees is 0.724
both when standardising by public or by private sector means. Of this total, reported in the last row in Table 7A, 0.478 is
explained by differences in the characteristics of individuals and 0.246 (i.e. about 34%) of this raw difference in earnings
Table 7A
Public–private wage decomposition—males (15–65), OLS
Based on OLS
estimates
Males
Standardising by public means Standardising by private means
Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined (T) Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined **(T)
INTERCEPT 0.578 0.000 0.578 0.578 0.000 0.578
AGEYRS 0.973 0.628 0.345 0.794 0.450 0.345
AGE2 0.754 0.448 0.306 0.543 0.238 0.306
LESSPRIM 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
PRIMARY 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.002
MIDDLE 0.000 0.012 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.013
MATRIC 0.014 0.026 0.040 0.008 0.032 0.040
INTER 0.017 0.026 0.042 0.005 0.037 0.042
BACHELORS 0.005 0.088 0.093 0.001 0.092 0.093
MA 0.032 0.102 0.070 0.004 0.074 0.070
ODEGREES 0.002 0.038 0.036 0.000 0.037 0.036
URBAN 0.036 0.017 0.019 0.030 0.011 0.019
SINDH 0.042 0.000 0.042 0.041 0.001 0.042
NWFP 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.012
BALOCHISTAN 0.028 0.021 0.008 0.014 0.006 0.008
Total 0.246 0.478 0.724 0.246 0.478 0.724
Unexplained gap (%) 33.9 33.9
Note: Estimates based on parameters from columns (1) and (2) in Table 6.
Table 7B
Public–private wage decomposition—females (15–65), OLS
Based on OLS
estimates
Females
Standardising by public means Standardising by private means
Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined (T) Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined (T)
INTERCEPT 0.196 0.000 0.196 0.196 0.000 0.196
AGEYRS 2.038 0.054 2.092 1.869 0.223 2.092
AGE2 0.663 0.025 0.688 0.599 0.089 0.688
LESSPRIM 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.056 0.049 0.007
PRIMARY 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
MIDDLE 0.014 0.006 0.019 0.027 0.008 0.019
MATRIC 0.027 0.010 0.037 0.008 0.028 0.037
INTER 0.024 0.049 0.026 0.007 0.033 0.026
BACHELORS 0.065 0.139 0.074 0.016 0.090 0.074
MA 0.140 0.233 0.093 0.027 0.120 0.093
ODEGREES 0.031 0.062 0.032 0.009 0.041 0.032
URBAN 0.028 0.013 0.015 0.022 0.007 0.015
SINDH 0.068 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.000 0.068
NWFP 0.001 0.017 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.018
BALOCHISTAN 0.059 0.054 0.006 0.015 0.009 0.006
Total 0.772 0.600 1.372 0.836 0.537 1.372
Unexplained gap (%) 56.3 60.9
Note: Estimates based on parameters from columns (1) and (2) in Table 7.
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remains ‘unexplained’. In other words, the relatively higher wages of public-sector male employees are not fully explained
by superior experience, education, urban residence or provincial variations.
Table 7A also shows thatmuch of the pro-public wage gap for men is explained by the superior characteristics of workers
in public sector jobs rather than higher returns by the government for possessing these characteristics. For instance, for all
education levels above (and including MATRIC), the proportions attributable to characteristics (E) are higher than those to
the rewards to possessing those characteristics (D). Also note that of the total wage gap (0.724), education explains about 39
(35)% of the total wage gap when standardising my public (private) sector means.
Table 7B reports theOLS-baseddecomposition results forwage-workingwomen. Firstly, notice that the rawgap inmonthly
earnings expressed in natural logs between the public and private sectors is greater for women at 1.372 compared to that for
men (0.724). The larger public-sectorwage premium forwomen (compared tomen) can be seen as lesserwage discrimination
in the public sector, similar to the argument proposed by Smith (1976). Note also that a smaller proportion of this wage-gap is
‘explained’ by difference in characteristics—about 60% of the sectoral wage gap is not explained by differences in observed
characteristics betweenwomen in the two sectors. One explanation for this could be that unobserved or unmeasured variables
are more important for women for pay determination compared tomen and our study has not adequately quantiﬁed them. It
may even be that the observed variables used to proxy ‘experience’ are less well measured forwomen compared tomen. Even
thoughwomen, on record, may have the same years of experience asmen but due to family commitments theymay take time
off more often or work fewer hours in which case learning-by-doing would be less than for men. Alternatively, the larger
‘unexplained’ proportion forwomen compared tomen could be because of a greater extent of ‘discrimination’ against them in
the private sector. This is also borne out by the results in Table 4. Comparing the coefﬁcients on MALE in columns (2) and (3),
clearly, the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly larger in theprivate-sector compared to thepublic sector andshowsthatwhilemales earn
19% more than women in the public sector, they earn more than four times as much in the private sector indicating a greater
degree of differential treatment against women in the private compared to the public sector.
However, as with men, the pro-public gap in earnings is explained by women in government jobs possessing superior
characteristics rather than the government sector rewarding these characteristics more (the larger number of negative signs
in ‘rewards’ under column D is outweighed by the larger coefﬁcients and positive signs in the ‘characteristics’ under column
E). If anything, public sector jobs’ returns to almost all characteristics are less than in the private sector (negative signs)
except AGEYRSwhich is substantially highly rewarded in government employment. Finally, we note that education explains
about 35 (27)% of the total sectoral gap in log earnings (1.372) when standardising by public (private) sector means.
It is worth noting, however, that as the earnings functions do not control for hours worked (due to lack of data), some of
the variation in earnings is attributable to hours worked. Thus, if private-sector wage earners work, on average, longer hours
per month than individuals in the public sector, the public–private wage gap may be much narrower than its hourly
equivalent. Some of this variation in hours worked may be captured through occupation controls and the decomposition
exercise were repeated using the following one-digit occupation dummies: managers (equals 1 if manager, 0 otherwise and
so on), professionals, associate professionals, clerks, services, agriculture, crafts andmachine operators. Those in elementary
occupations constituted the omitted category. The decomposition exercise (using OLS) shows that between 28 and 33% of
the public–private wage gap for men is unexplained while for women between 52 and 65% of the wage-gap is now
unexplained (when standardising by public and private sector means, respectively). Thus, while the upper-bound estimate
of the unexplained wage-gap remains largely unchanged for men, the incorporation of occupation dummies to control
(albeit partially) for hours worked causes the upper-bound estimate to increase for women suggesting that part of the story
indeed rests on the difference in hours worked13.
Summarising, the results of the decomposition exercise reveal that some 34 (60%) of the public–privatewage difference is
not explained by public sector men (women) possessing superior characteristics compared to their counterparts in the
private sector. Among the most common explanations proposed in extant literature for the existence of the ‘unexplained’
portion of the wage gap is the public-sector ‘economic rents’ argument. Alternatively, however, if there are important
differences in the unobserved or unmeasured characteristics of workers in the two sectors, the ‘unexplained’ portion could
be capturing these. Moreover, the decomposition results are based on OLS estimates but part of the problem with these is
that the education dummies in earning function estimates are potentially endogenous. This endogeneity arises if unobserved
variables such as ability increase individual earnings and also increase schooling (for instance if more able individuals also
acquiremore schooling). As ability is often unobserved, it resides in the error term of the earnings function. This will bias the
OLS parameter estimates upward.
One way of addressing the aforementioned concerns is to use household ﬁxed-effects (FE) on sub-samples of at least two
wage workers of each gender in a given household. This provides a cleaner test since unobserved or unmeasured
characteristics differences such as ability between males (or females) within the family are likely to be much lower than
across families. Ideally, one should estimate earnings functions using household ﬁxed-effects for both males and females.
However, the sample of female wage earners in each sector is relatively small to begin with and would be considerably
reduced by restricting it to at least two female wage earners in a given household to make meaningful inferences. However,
there are slightly more than 2000 households with at least two male-wage earners aged 15–65 on whom this approach can
13 The detailed results of earnings functions incorporating occupation dummies and the consequent decomposition exercise are available from the
authors on request. We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point.
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be applied. As we are interested in investigating public–private differentials, earnings functions are estimated using
household ﬁxed-effects on separate sub-samples of households with at least two male members in a given sector. All male
members (related/unrelated directly) and recorded as household residents are initially included in the sample. As a
robustness check, the decomposition exercise is done on the sample of only directly ‘related’ males (exclude non-relatives,
fathers-in-law and sons-in-law of the household head). Two caveats must be noted: clearly, the household ﬁxed-effects
approach outlined above cannot net out ability differences. Also, imposing constraints on the samples introduces further
selectivity problems. However, the ﬁxed-effects approach is still a useful procedure as it is a powerful way of netting out at
least environmental effects and thus helps in putting a tighter bound on the true effects.
The decomposition results based on the ﬁxed-effects estimates are presented in Table 8. The ﬁxed-effects ﬁndings show
that an even larger proportion of the log wage-gap (0.755) is now unexplained compared to OLS estimates in 7A—about 69
and 51% when standardising by public and private means, respectively. These estimates rise even more when done on the
sample of ‘related’ males—to 77 and 64%, respectively, when standardised by public and private sector means. If unobserved
factors such as ability contribute towards the ‘unexplained’ portion rather than rents, we would expect the unexplained
portion to fall after controlling for HH ﬁxed effects. The rise in the ‘unexplained’ portion suggests that the wage differentials
are arising because of rents or some other explanation rather than household-level unobserved factors controlled for in
household ﬁxed-effects estimation14.
Our results partially corroborate and partially diverge from Nasir’s (2000) ﬁndings. Contrary to our estimates, the author
using Labour Force Survey data from 1997 for men only ﬁnds a relatively small public–private wage gap (0.05) in favour of
the public sector of which a larger proportion is explained by superior characteristics of public-sector employees (0.12).
However, the author notes that the rate of compensation of private sector workers is higher compared to government sector
counterparts which is consistent with our ﬁnding that much of the gap in wages is due to superior public-sector
characteristics rather than higher public sector rewards (for both men and women). It is important to note that Nasir
distinguishes between the private formal and informal sectors and the aforementioned results are for the comparison
between the public and private formal sectors15. However, the public–private informal sector ﬁndings are even more
consistent with ours—of the wage-gap (0.526), almost 37% remains unexplained (not different from our ﬁndings for men in
8A). Our ﬁndings are also not very different from Hyder and Reilly’s (2005) estimates based on a sample of men and women
in waged employment in public, private and ‘state-owned’ enterprises (SOE). Using the 2002 Labour Force Survey from
Pakistan, the authors ﬁnd an average gap of 0.685 (between the public and private sectors) for a pooled sample of men and
women, of which roughly 40% is explained by differences in characteristics (compared with 66% in our sample of men and
40% among women). The authors do not report, nor discuss, the differential ‘returns/rewards’ in the two sectors.
However, it is important to note that our ﬁndings are not directly comparable with the two previous studies because: (1)
our ﬁndings are based on a household survey rather than a labour-force survey; (2) we use an all-encompassing deﬁnition of
‘private’; (3) to our knowledge, ours is the only study in Pakistan that estimates public–private wage differentials separately
for men and women; (4) this study attempts to highlight sample-selection using multinomial logits16; and (5) uses
household ﬁxed-effects to address the problem of unobservables that may generate biases in earnings function estimates.
Table 8
Public–private wage decomposition—males (15–65), household ﬁxed-effects
Based on FE estimates Males
Standardising by public means Standardising by private means
Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined (T) Coefﬁcients (D) Characteristics (E) Combined (T)
INTERCEPT 0.459 0.000 0.459 0.459 0.000 0.459
AGEYRS 0.596 0.335 0.262 0.498 0.236 0.262
AGE2 0.522 0.215 0.307 0.395 0.088 0.307
LESSPRIM 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.002
PRIMARY 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.001
MIDDLE 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.007
MATRIC 0.032 0.023 0.055 0.014 0.040 0.055
INTER 0.027 0.008 0.034 0.007 0.027 0.034
BACHELORS 0.055 0.026 0.081 0.009 0.072 0.081
MA 0.023 0.040 0.063 0.002 0.061 0.063
ODEGREES 0.002 0.025 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.023
Total 0.519 0.236 0.755 0.388 0.367 0.755
Unexplained gap (%) 68.7 51.4
Note: Estimates based on household ﬁxed-effects results not reported but available from authors on request.
14 Summary statistics of wage earning males in the ﬁxed-effects sample and earnings function estimates are available from the authors on request.
15 The author’s exposition of what constitutes the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ private sectors is very unclear.
16 While Hyder and Reilly (2005) address sample-selectivity in sectoral choice using Heckman’s approach, they do not address the second cause of
selection bias, i.e. the choice between labour force participation and non-participation. Nasir (2000) study uses simple OLS to estimate earnings functions
and no mention is made of sample selection as a potential problem in his study.
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5. Conclusion
The objective of this study was to examine wage differentials between public and private sector jobs for males and
females in Pakistan. The raw public–private differential in gross wages was more than 1.5 times as high for men and more
than three times as high for women.While conditioning on education and experience reduced the size of the public–private
wage differential for both genders, the standardised differential remained very substantial.
Robust estimates of wage functions (and hence ofwage differentials) were obtained using threemethodologies: Ordinary
Least Squares, Sample-selectivity-corrected and household ﬁxed-effects. The parameters of the estimated wage functions
were then used to decompose the public–private wage differential into the portion ‘explained’ by public–private differences
inworkers’mean characteristics and the ‘unexplained’ portion. The latest, nationally representative data (the Pakistan Living
Standards Measurement Survey, PSLM, 2005) were used. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to estimate ceteris paribus
public–private wage differentials separately for males and females.
The vector of coefﬁcients differed quite substantially across males and female wage-functions in the public and private
sectors, highlighting the importance of estimatingwage functions separately by gender. TheOaxaca-decomposition revealed
that while differences in public–private worker characteristics explained about 66% of the public–private difference in log
wage formen, the corresponding ﬁgure for womenwas only 40%.While formen, household ﬁxed-effects could be used in an
attempt to control for workers’ unobserved characteristics, this was not possible on the small sample of female wage-
earners. While in OLS estimates, 66% of the public–private wage gap for men was explained by the differing observed
characteristics of public and private employees, in the household ﬁxed-effects estimates for men, the explained proportion
fell to about 40%, i.e. the residual or unexplained portion was about 60%.
What might account for the residual element? For men, we can argue that it could be ‘rents’ accruing to public sector
workers (since we have controlled, arguably with some success, for men’s unobserved characteristics via household ﬁxed-
effects estimation). However, for women we cannot rule out that it is differences in unobservables (observed and hence
rewarded by employers, but not observed by researchers) that drive the residual. What we can say is that public sector
workers invariably enjoy large premiums compared to private sector workers and this could simply be because they are
‘lucky’ to be working in the government sector (as argued by Lokshin & Glinskaya, 2005 for India) or have the right social
connections and networks to become a part of the coveted public sector.
Appendix A
See Tables A1 and A2.
Table A1
Multinomial logit estimates, omitted category ‘Other’—males (aged 15–65)
VARIABLE Private (1) z-value (S.E.) Public (2) z-value (S.E.)
AGEYRS 0.170 (0.007)*** 0.533 (0.015)***
AGE2 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.006 (0.000)***
LESSPRIM 0.054 (0.064) 0.730 (0.152)***
PRIMARY 0.053 (0.052) 1.085 (0.104)***
MIDDLE 0.355 (0.050)*** 1.025 (0.106)***
MATRIC 0.681 (0.049)*** 1.954 (0.086)***
INTER 0.905 (0.081)*** 2.416 (0.106)***
BACHELORS 0.424 (0.079)*** 2.962 (0.099)***
MA 0.012 (0.150) 3.814 (0.136)***
ODEGREES 0.417 (0.148)*** 2.956 (0.146)***
CHILD5 0.067 (0.014)*** 0.031 (0.018)*
ADULT70 0.089 (0.046)* 0.191 (0.068)***
OALAND 1.148 (0.045)*** 0.539 (0.060)***
URBAN 0.091 (0.040)** 0.096 (0.063)
SINDH 0.146 (0.046)*** 0.208 (0.069)***
NWFP 0.057 (0.049) 0.518 (0.072)***
BALOCHISTAN 0.399 (0.057)*** 1.203 (0.075)***
CONSTANT 5.060 (0.143)*** 14.743 (0.317)***
Pseudo-R2 0.158
N 28,179
Log-likelihood 19992.9
Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is categorised as (1) = participation in ‘Other’ where
other constitutes non-labour force participation, unemployment, livestock ownership or self-employment (agricultural/non-agricultural), (2) = participa-
tion in waged work in private sector and (3) = participation in waged work in public sector. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
corrected for clustering at the household-level. (–) Denotes not applicable. NO_EDUCATION and PUNJAB are the reference categories for education splines
and province, respectively.
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Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is categorised as: (1) = participation in ‘Other’ where
other constitutes non-labour force participation, unemployment, livestock ownership or self-employment (agricultural/non-agricultural), (2) = participa-
tion in waged work in private sector and (3) = participation in waged work in public sector. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
corrected for clustering at the household-level. (–) Denotes not applicable. NO_EDUCATION and PUNJAB are the reference categories for education splines
and province, respectively.
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